recorder at the Berlin Funkausteilung.
1940
RCA Victor presented the first ever 'Gold Disc' to Glenn Miller for the million selling 'Chattanooga Choo-choo'. Tremendous improvements to sound quality took place. During the war years background music came of age. The first demonstration of the transistor by Shockley, Britain and Bardeen cause a revolution in recording equipment design and performance parameters. RCA releases the first 7-inch diameter, 45 rpm microgroove discs.
1950
Cinerama presented multi sound track replay to the public for the first time. The stimulated public interest for stereo products heated up. Stereo LPs became available and new releases were issued in both mono and stereo versions. The Philips original cast recording of 'My Fair Lady' was one of the first million LP sellers.
1960
Stereo replaces mono as the recording mode. Philips introduced the Musicasette and did not protect its cassette as a proprietary technology but encouraged other companies to license its use. Pre-recorded 8 track cartridges appeared on the 'in-car entertainment' market. Dr. Ray Dolby introduced the Dolby Noise Reduction System, which became a universal standard. By 1968 cassette player manufacturers had sold over 2.4 million cassette players worldwide and in that year alone the cassette business was worth about $150 million.
1970
Quadraphonic records appeared on the market but public reaction was unenthusiastic due to the confusion of incompatible systems and the economic climate. In 1978, Philips announces the first Compact Disc. Sony introduced the Soundabout cassette player which was later renamed the Walkman. By the end of the decade the average house contained two or three 'talking machines'. The cassette begun to challenge the disc as the most popular format and the number of LPs sold gradually declined.
1980
The Walkman II was introduced. MTV (Music Television) began transmitting video clips. During the next years, the music video became essential for the promotion of a recording and established as a promotional tool it became an entertainment product. Michael Jackson's 'Thriller' album released by Columbia sold 40 million copies worldwide. Philips and Sony produced a commercial digital play back record. CD hardware and software was launched in Japan. In 1988, for the first time CD sales were higher than vinyl. By 1989, the CD accounted for over 200 million units and the LP was beginning to disappear from record stores.
1990
Philips introduces its Compact Disc Interactive (CD-I) that could play audio discs and films as well as computer games. Sony introduces the MiniDisc (MD), which combined the reproduction quality of a CD with the ease of recording the audiocassette. The CD remained the dominant format. The first Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) product was shown. The DVD is essentially a faster CD with a huge capacity capable of holding video as well as audio and computer data. Elton John's tribute to Diana, Princess of Wales, 'Candle in the Wind 1997' became the fastest selling single ever and was certified 8 times platinum by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) within 24 hours of release. Music piracy on the Internet, using the MP3 format starts to proliferate. SDMI specification published, aiming to provide a legal alternative to pirate music.
During the last 20 years, the industry has seen unprecedented change. By the late 70's discos became the primary channel of distribution for record companies to generate local sales and promote inexpensively. Additionally, the retail outlet, the DJ and the National Top 40 were the important elements of the marketing system for record albums. Then in the 80's, big musical hits called "gorillas" emerged and there were no longer specialized markets to support a small hit. The companies that succeeded in the business were the large ones that had the best hold on the entire marketing chain down to the consumers and managed to propel to success by introducing an overnight success.
With the proliferation of new distribution systems like MTV, compact discs, cassettes, and video, the pop music business exploded in numerous directions. However, the record companies attempted to suppress the market, partly by controlling supply. The strategy was to lower corporate risk and enhance the predictability of profits by clustering music fans around star performers.
In the mid 90's the industry experienced a record year for record sales. Industry revenues skyrocketed 20%, which was the biggest percentage gain in 74 years. Reflecting the enormous success of compact discs and a new generation of top-selling artists. Recording industry revenues rose 20%, the largest such gain since 1920. The value of annual domestic shipments of prerecorded music and music videos exceeded $12 billion in 1994.
In 1997, only three years later, a smaller retail base and the development of special market activity, which include mail order, record clubs, and non-music retailers, threatened the industry. The U.S. record industry reported a 6.5% decrease in overall net shipments compared with 1996. Record companies responded by developing tougher inventory controls at the retail level, to a pipeline that could deliver products to stores faster than ever before, and to service the direct and special markets better.
MP3 Changes Digital Music Technology
The digital storage of music is not a new idea, having been brought to the mass market with the advent of the Compact Disc. The problem was that a relatively large amount of computer storage space was required for CD quality audio, and few forms of compression existed which were effective in storing audio in less space while preserving quality. In 1989, the Fraunhofer Institut in Erlangen, Germany was granted a patent for the MP3 1 software compression standard which allowed digital audio to be compressed to approximately one tenth the size of the original audio with almost no discernable loss of quality to the average listener. Although it was technically a lossy 2 compression standard, MP3 took advantage of some peculiarities of human hearing to make the compressed version sound identical to the original. But the real breakthrough was that it was able to accomplish this in a compressed version which was small enough to be feasibly transmitted over modem-speed connections, and most significantly, made freely available as a public domain standard.
As of 1998, a number of software applications existed which allowed users to make their own MP3's, including Fraunhofer's own command-line application, and a handful of other MP3 ripping 3 programs from niche software vendors. However, the only way to obtain MP3's from others was to 1 MP3 stands for MPEG-3, or Moving Pictures Experts Group, Audio Layer III 2 Lossy compression refers to any method of compression which does not allow an exact digital duplicate of the original, uncompressed file to be restored from the compressed version. 3 Ripping refers to extracting an exact digital replica of the audio content from a CD, through the use of a CD-ROM drive with special capabilities, usually for downloading onto one's hard drive for compression into MP3 format.
download them from friends, web sites, FTP sites, or Usenet 4 groups. Considering that any web site or FTP site which provided copyrighted music files was both breaking the law as well as draining the resources of their Internet Service Provider (ISP), most of these were shut down as soon as they were discovered. As a result, finding working web or FTP sites was a tedious process which would rarely result in successfully finding the songs for which a user was looking. Usenet groups offered a more guaranteed stream of working MP3 files, but the only to those willing to download any music indiscriminately. There was no good way to search a large portion of the Internet for a given song or artist, and instantly be able to download that track if it were found.
Napster Takes MP3 Mainstream
In May 1999, Napster added the exact functionality that users wanted. Napster was the first of the peer-to-peer (or P2P) systems which allowed many users (e.g. hundreds of thousands or more) to connect to a sub-network which allowed them to share files they each stored on their computers. Napster was optimized for sharing music files -and thus let users search for songs by artist, title, sampling quality, and other characteristics. The system worked very smoothly, and users could locate others who had the files they wanted, and start downloading from them instantly. In addition, since the Napster servers themselves did not contain any copyright-violating songs (as the web sites and FTP sites that distributed MP3's did) it technically shifted the legal responsibility onto its users to ensure that the files they were making available to the system were not in violation of any laws. Of course, the primary appeal of Napster was that these users were only there to share songs which violated copyright.
Napster grew explosively through both word of mouth and publicity in the general media. By October 2000, it was estimated that Napster's software was on 30% of all PC's and continuing to grow. The diffusion rate was phenomenal, much greater than that of most new technologies: 
Sources: PMAI, Consumer Electronics Association, MPAA, Paul Kagan Associates, Ebrain Market Research, Infotrends, Jupiter Media Metrix
In addition, by March of 2001, the average user would spend far more time using Napster than they would browsing any music-related web site on the Internet, as shown below:
Fall of Napster, Rise of True P2P
Napster was assaulted by legal challenges from its inception, and they ultimately led to its downfall as the premier file sharing system. In March 2001, a US court ordered Napster to block the sharing of all copyrighted songs. Users responded by utilizing tricks such as renaming files, but the simplicity of the system and the number of songs available dropped dramatically. As a result, the number of people using Napster went from a high of 15 million in February 2001 to 12 million in March and continued to decrease until the point when the service went off-line in December 2001.
But users and competitors were well aware of Napster's legal difficulties, and new systems began appearing throughout 2000. Unlike Napster, these systems recognized that having a central file server, maintained by the software vendor, which contains a list of all of the users on the network provides an easy point of attack from a legal standpoint. Instead, these systems were built on true P2P technologies, where no central file server was required. The idea was that as long as users had the application and the Internet, they could connect to each other and share files, with nobody for the RIAA to go after 5 .
Three of the new technologies which have emerged as the frontrunners in this next wave are FastTrack, Gnutella and Freenet. Gnutella was the first of these systems, and gained a great deal of publicity because of its origins. It was originally a project at NullSoft, the creators of the WinAmp MP3 software, but upon their acquisition by AOL, the project was discovered and terminated. However, the code was already on the net at this point, and independent software developers took over its development and turned it into an open P2P standard, with many different client programs which supported it. Gnutella's failing was that although it was a powerful system from a computer science point of view, it was actually a step backward from Napster as far as the ease of use provided in any of its client interfaces.
FastTrack, a company based in the Netherlands, created a powerful system which supported sharing not only MP3 files, but videos, documents and software as well, with custom interfaces for each. It licensed this technology to three different organizations which produced Morpheus, KaZaA and Grokster -three applications which connect to the same network and had essentially the same features. The underlying FastTrack technology also included the ability to allow users to download different portions of the same file from multiple computers simultaneously -thus greatly decreasing download times and increasing the utilization of high-speed connections. The usage of this system has grown at a rate faster than Napster, and as of February 2002, has more users than Napster ever had.
Freenet is trying to create an entirely new kind of network -essentially the idea of a real-time network which runs through the Internet. It is a giant, scalable peer-to-peer network that allows information to be uploaded to it ("inserted", in Freenet terminology), and that information stays on anonymous servers (actually, the computers of Freenet users) which can stay up 24/7 or go down -it doesn't matter, since the servers are redundant and the network is built to withstand nodes failing. Freenet is gaining momentum within the high tech community, and one user-oriented browser, Frost, has been developed to provide Napster like functionality. While it does not yet have the user-friendliness which would make it a threat to systems such as FastTrack for the mass market, the anonymity designed into its structure suggests it may outlive legal and other attacks on other file-sharing systems.
Finally, Napster the idea actually lives on, separately from Napster the company. The protocol that Napster created has been expanded and used in a new system called OpenNap which essentially creates a true P2P system around the previous standard. There are now over 30 different client applications which support OpenNap, and the transfer of images and videos as well as audio is supported.
Key Players
The principal actors in the recorded music industry are affected by the disruption in different ways. The traditional value chain for recorded music was fairly straightforward: Other parties are involved in this process at different stages, or affecting these actors, include:
• Radio and Television stations playing singles and videos (channel marketing) • Corporations and other organizations are often paid consumers of music, for the purpose of movies, television and other productions • And now, P2P networks allowing consumers to distribute music to each other without paying fees to retailers, or royalties to producers or artists What are the key future scenarios for the evolution of the market and technology environment that these players' strategies must prepare for and respond to?
Future Scenarios These Players May Need to Contend With
The following lay out what appear to be the most likely paths that the industry could take.
Scenario 1: On-Line Selling Becomes the Standard
This is the scenario the record industry would most like to see. It would not only allow them to retain their market power, but they would also have a much lower cost distribution mechanism which would make them even more profitable. If, through the legal system and social pressure they can prevent any P2P system from being functional in the long-term, and provide a sufficient disincentive to new companies contemplating the creation of such systems. Consumers may also grow tired of switching from one ostensibly illegal system to another every few months, and record companies may adopt more guerilla initiatives, such as uploading false content to P2P networks, further increasing customer dissatisfaction with such systems. In addition, the government may also take more active steps to prevent such usage of computer networks, in the form of new legislation requiring ISPs to install software monitoring certain P2P systems and blocking them. Corporations, and some college campuses, blocked Napster in the past and many block FastTrack systems as well. The success of this scenario is certainly linked to the success of secure systems for distributing music on-line, and that is still an open question. In 2000, a challenge was issued by SDMI 6 to any group that could crack their encryption standard. A group of Princeton researchers provided the solution almost immediately -and just as quickly, SDMI sued them to prevent them from revealing their methods to anyone else. Finally, efforts to prevent CDs from being ripped need to gain momentum, especially considering that many players in the industry do not agree with the new scheme to introduce errors onto CDs iii which could cause them to be incompatible with many players.
Scenario 2: P2P Systems Succeed in Capturing Market Power
On-line services that use, or masquerade on, port 80 7 or work through other web-based systems may prove to be unstoppable by legal means. The astonishing adoption rates of Napster and FastTrack may carry over to future systems, not only making P2P networks the top source for music for most people, but also becoming so widespread that it reduces any remaining social stigma associated with downloading intellectual property without paying for it. Appendix A provides details on the high growth rate of MP3 player sales. Downloading music from a P2P system is already almost as fast as legally ripping it from a CD, so CD sales could deteriorate not only because of cost benefits to consumers, but for convenience benefits as well. This scenario would have dire ramifications for both artists and record labels. It is possible they may be able to convince consumers to some extent that quality music will no longer be produced if artists don't make money from record sales. However, while a relatively small cadre of labels have market power, this does not necessarily lead to the highest quality music being available to consumers. Mass audiences may, in time, prefer a music industry where, rather than 1000 multimillionaires producing 99% of all new popular music, 100,000 artists making low six-figure incomes make even higher quality music available. If this scenario starts gaining strength, then the incumbent labels and artists will be forced to reassess their approach to the industry.
Scenario 3: Future Technology Makes Individual Music Purchases Obsolete
The amount of music an individual can store -and carry with them -is increasing at rate which far outstrips Moore's Law. The average US citizen certainly owns fewer than 1000 CD's, yet standard computer hard drives are already large enough to store 1000 CD's worth of information in MP3 format. The WMA 8 format, which Microsoft has licensed for public use, and is already supported by all Windows PCs and many MP3 players, is nearly twice as efficient in storing audio information without discernable quality loss. With next generation high speed connectivity standards like USB 2.0 and Firewire allowing users to download their entire collections to each others' hard drives in a matter of minutes, it may become the standard for users to merely synchronize all of their music with one another rather than searching for, and purchasing, music on an individual CD or song basis. Digital Radio may become widespread, and become the primary source for the insertion of music into networks of communal ownership. In this scenario, not only would CD sales plummet, but even P2P systems would be useful only for niche songs -which only account for a small portion of industry revenues anyway. The role of artists and record labels in the value chain would be redefined, and new approaches would have to be found to cope with the change. The end result could reflect something along the lines of that outlined in Scenario 2.
Scenario 4: The Internet Redefines the Nature of Intellectual Property
The ability to police content on the Internet seems to be becoming less possible rather than more possible, due to the growth of the global network in areas where legal standards are less defined, as well as rapid advances in technology. No perfect filter has yet been created which is able to block one type of objectionable content (e.g. illegally distributed music files on web pages) without curtailing access to other information (e.g. web articles about MP3 files) as well. If market forces continue to move in a direction that makes the anonymous distribution of generic computer files popular and easy (e.g. user friendly applications based on Freenet) then it could redefine the nature of copyrights themselves. Even Canada has different rules related to copyrighted content than the United States, and blocking content on a case-by-case basis, country-by-country seems completely unfeasible.
Much of the Internet was designed by academics and free speech radicals, and although it has since gone mainstream, the radical free speech movement is still behind many of the core technologies and philosophies which shape the network. In The Media Lab: Inventing the Future at MIT, Stewart Brand coined the phrase "information wants to be free" -which has become a rallying call for many. 8 Windows Media Audio Richard Stallman, the well known UNIX guru behind the GNU General Public License (GPL) 9 , believes that software should not have owners iv . Current news is already available for free, and Project Gutenberg dedicates itself to the dissemination of classic works whose copyright has expired to the general public. The Internet could come to be regarded as information in a type of global public library, with intellectual property ownership only applying to commercial uses of that property.
In this scenario, every producer of intellectual property, from recording artists to movie producers and book authors, would be affected, and it is unclear what -if anything -they can do about it.
Implications for the Strategy of the Key Players
The strategy recommendations set forth in this paper are confined to one industry player category: the recording industry. A common thread in three of the four preceding scenarios is that an increasing number of people are going to free electronic sources to find and download music. With true P2P systems gaining strength and becoming nearly impossible to stop through the legal system, the recording industry faces some difficult choices about what to do.
Strategic Option 1: Do nothing. The recording industry could rely upon a core constituency of individuals who either do not possess the necessary technology to use on-line music, or do not wish to engage in activity which is technically illegal -though not looked harshly upon in most social circles. This is essentially the approach taken in the software market. The illegal distribution of free music amongst younger trend-setters, as with software, could become a key means of marketing it, while the legal purchase by a broader, law-abiding public provides the revenue.
Strategic Option 2:
Attempt to develop a competing on-line music service to the free P2P systems, which provides a more complete catalog of music at a discounted rate, with benefits that only a fully legal system could provide (links to videos, web sites, detailed information on songs and artists, lyrics, user support, etc.) This is similar to what Bertelsmann is trying with Napster. There are a number of concerns about this strategy however. This foremost is whether or not users would even be willing to pay for the service. So far, studies indicate about 40% of users say they would pay something, suggesting there may be a market, although it is unclear whether responses accurately predicted their behavior in the case that other free services are available.
9
A licensing scheme which permits the inclusion of one piece of computer code in another program, but requires the destination program to also be distributed under the same license. It has been called a "virus" by Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer.
Customer Receptivity to Paid Music Subscription Services
Another concern is that any system which puts a large catalogue of music on-line on a subscription basis is subject to abuse -making it easy for hackers to use the new service as a pipeline for transmitting new data into free P2P systems.
Finally, the recording industry would need to overcome the challenge that illegal networks have typically had a more complete catalog of music, insofar as music from any source and any distributor can be uploaded. To combat this, the industry would need to find a way to build common content bases, possibly across competing platforms, so that legal initiatives could match the catalogue-completeness of the illegal networks.
A different kind of competitive threat is represented by MP3.com and the proliferation of artists who are willing to give away high quality content for free legally. These artists use MP3.com and other sites to gain visibility, and could potentially represent threats to major commercial artists. But so far this threat has failed to materialize, so long as national and international artists get the majority of radio and video airplay (and radio and television continue to be primary drivers of listening tastes). Strategies must be in place today that can help a firm succeed in an uncertain future. As the actual shape of the future unfolds, industry players that can update their strategies most quickly are most likely to succeed. This section attempts to outline some of the statistics and data points that recording industry players should closely monitor such that they can be among the first to adjust their strategies over time as new realities become apparent.
Recommended Strategic Monitoring Activities for the Recording Industry
The key issue that recording industry players must track is whether the market is moving toward Scenario 1, or one of Scenarios 2/3/4. Napster's claim (supporting Scenario 1) is that they believe their system merely helps to sell more records. Current data suggest that this is not correct (see Appendix A), but this should be tracked, by closely monitoring key indicators such as:
• Number of downloads from free services • Sales of CDs to key demographics (which overlap with high Internet usage demographics) Some leading indicators which may help predict the above include:
• Sales of MP3 players • % of the population that has broadband internet access • % of the population that believes there's nothing wrong with downloading music illegally • Number of users of popular file sharing systems
Conclusion
All four Scenarios presented suggest that there will be significant erosion of legal sales of music. It is likely that a new paradigm for the production, distribution, sale and use of music in society will be formed, and that the role of major record labels in the future will change. Supporting this thesis, nearly twice as many MP3 files were downloaded last year as the equivalent amount of music sold in CD format 10 . If all these transactions had taken place in the US, this translates to roughly 20 CDs downloaded for free in every US household last year, compared with only 10 CDs purchased.
On the other hand, P2P systems mean greater mass appeal for artists than ever before. Unfortunately, it could very well mean ever shrinking royalties, and a greater reliance upon touring and paid appearances as a source of revenue.
One thing that seems clear is that there is no first mover advantage in a market which has demonstrated continually both its dexterity, capriciousness and willingness to try new software merely to be able to get access to more content. The best strategy in the short term may be simply to press on with law suits against software developers -including P2P software vendors (such as the lawsuits brought against Morpheus and FastTrack recently) -and continue pilot projects to see exactly how consumers do react to convenient, commercial subscription based systems.
APPENDIX A: MUSIC SALES STATISTICS
In 1999, U.S. sales of cassettes, music videos, and singles declined sharply, while growth in CD sales slowed somewhat. Retailers weathered consolidations, continued to control inventory effectively, and maintained an efficient product pipeline between manufacturers and retailers. The CD became a mature product and the big increases of the early to mid-'90s, when consumers were replacing their vinyl and tape collections with CDs, were over. On the other hand, DVD music video sales experienced some record growth since unit sales increased 405%, to 2.5 million from 485,000. As for special markets, unit sales were up 6.1%, to 291 million. This category, which also covers online sales, accounted for about 25% of the total music market. Most of that came from record clubs.
In the last two years, the music industry has begun to sing the blues. Faced with the worst decline in sales since disco died, the five global music giants had to restructure and drop some contracts with high-priced artists. By the beginning of the new millennium, more than 75 percent of the world's music market was controlled by just five conglomerates: AOL Time Warner Inc., EMI Group, Vivendi Universal SA, Sony Corp. and Bertelsmann AG. These mega media companies are faced with the need to respond to investors and to show short-term profits, so in turn there are more demands on the music divisions to deliver quick hits than ever before.
Online digital distribution of music has grown in popularity since Napster's introduction in 1999. According to the Recording Industry Association of America's own public newsletter, one-third of all music consumers have heard of Napster-like services. Furthermore, one-third of those consumers had used one of these services. At its peak in early 2001, Napster had 60 million registered users. Since then, Jupiter Media Metrix estimates a 492% increase in Napster alternatives from March, 2001 to August, 2001 . These alternatives include Morpheus, KaZaA, Aimster, Audio Galaxy, iMesh, and others. Furthermore, this trend continues. According to market research firm Webnoize, the amount of downloaded media increased from KaZaA, Music City, and Grokster increased from 1.5 billion digitized media files in September, 2001 to 1.81 billion files in October, 2001.
Since sharing MP3 files results in few financial transactions, it is difficult to estimate the size of this industry in terms of sales. However, it is possible to track hardware sales of MP3 players compared to CD players. Dataquest estimates huge growth in MP3 player ownership in both world and domestic markets: Of particular interest is the demographics of MP3 owners. RIAA estimated in 2000 that 24% of 15-to 18-year old consumers own an MP3 player. That same year, 15-to 19-year olds constituted 12.6% of the RIAA's consumer population, down from 15.8% in 1999 (See Table 3 ).
Another way to measure the impact of digital distribution of music involves focusing on CD sales. In 2000, 942.5 million CD albums were sold, up only 0.4%. In contrast, the growth in CD sales from 1998 to 1999 was 10.8%. The difference is more astounding when looking at CD single sales: down 38.8% from 1999 to 2000, compared to a 0.1% decrease from 1998 to 1999. (See Table 4 .) What effect MP3 distribution had on CD sales is uncertain. Table 3   TABLE 4 
